DANE, or DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities, is a protocol for stuffing public key and or public key signatures into DNS. As standard DNS is forged easily, you can’t safely do this without DNSSEC. With DNSSEC, however, you now have an alternative way to verify public keys. Two obvious candidates for DANE data are SSH host keys and SSL certificate fingerprints. In this post I take you through using DNSSEC-secured DNS to verify web site SSL certificates via DNSSEC (sometimes called DNSSEC-stapled SSL certificates).
In DNSSEC Mastery I predicted that someone would release a browser plug-in to support validation of DNSSEC-staples SSL certificates. This isn’t a very difficult prediction, as a few different people had already started down that road. One day browsers will support DANE automatically, but until then, we need a plug-in. I’m pleased to report that the fine folks at dnssec-validator.cz have completed their TLSA verification plugin. I’m using it without problems in Firefox, Chrome, and IE.
DNS provides SSL certificate fingerprints with a TLSA record. (TLSA isn’t an acronym, it’s just a TLS record, type A. Presumably we’ll move on to TLSB at some point.)
A TLSA record looks like this:
_port._protocol.hostname TLSA ( 3 0 1 hash...)
If you’ve worked with services like VOIP, this should look pretty familiar. For example, the TLSA record for port 443 on the host dnssec.michaelwlucas.com looks like this:
_443._tcp.dnssec TLSA ( 3 0 1 4CB0F4E1136D86A6813EA4164F19D294005EBFC02F10CC400F1776C45A97F16C)
Where do we get the hash? Run openssl(1) on your certificate file. Here I generate the SHA256 hash of my certificate file, dnssec.mwl.com.crt.
# openssl x509 -noout -fingerprint -sha256 < dnssec.mwl.com.crt
Copy the fingerprint into the TLSA record. Remove the colons.
Interestingly, you can also use TLSA records to validate CA-signed certificates. Generate the hash the same way, but change the leading string to
1 0 1. I’m using a CA-signed certificate for https://www.michaelwlucas.com, but I also validate it via DNSSEC with a record like this.
_443._tcp.www TLSA ( 1 0 1 DBB17D0DE507BB4DE09180C6FE12BBEE20B96F2EF764D8A3E28EED45EBCCD6BA )
So: if you go to the trouble of setting this up, what does the client see?
Start by installing the DNSSEC/TLSA Validator plugin in your browser. (Peter Wemm has built the Firefox version of the plugin on FreeBSD, and he has a patch and a binary. Use the binary at your own risk, of course, but if you’re looking for a BSD porting project, this would be very useful.)
The plugin adds two new status icons. One turns green if the site’s DNS uses DNSSEC, and has a small gray-with-a-touch-of-red logo if the site does not. Not having DNSSEC is not cause for alarm. The second icon turns green if the SSL certificate matches a TLSA record, gray if there is no TLSA record, and red if the certificate does not match the TLSA record.
So: should you worry about that self-signed certificate? Check the TLSA record status. If the domain owner says “Yes, I created this cert,” it’s probably okay. If the self-signed cert fails TLSA validation, don’t go to the site.
You can use a variety of hashes with TLSA, and you can set a variety of conditions as well. Should all certificates in your company be signed with RapidSSL certs? You can specify that in a TLSA record. Do you have a private CA? Give its fingerprint in a TLSA record. If you want to play with these things, check out my DNSSEC book.
TLSA gives you an alternate avenue of trust, outside of the traditional and expensive CA model. Spreading TLSA more widely means that you can protect more services with SSL without additional financial expenses.